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GROUP AND PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES PLANS:
KENTUCKY RULES PROVIDE ETHICAL STANDARDS
I.
On May 16, 1972, through two rules adopted by the Court of
Appeals, Kentucky became the first state to establish formalized
ethical standards for furnishing legal services pursuant to a prepaid
legal services plan' and the second state to adopt standards for group
legal services.2 A third rule3 provides simply that no actively prac-
ticing member of the Kentucky Bar Association may have any
financial interest in any such plan.4 The rules were adopted at the
urging of the Kentucky Bar Association, and they evidence a recog-
nition on the part of both the Court and the practicing bar of a
need to improve the delivery of legal services to the average citizen
of the Commonwealth. 5
From the outset, it is important to distinguish group legal services
from prepaid legal services. Group legal services have been defined
as those rendered:
(1) to individual members of a group identifiable in terms of some
substantial common interest,
(2) by a lawyer provided, secured, recommended or otherwise
selected by:
(a) the group, its organization or its officers; or
(b) some other agency having an interest in obtaining legal
services for members of the group.6
The most common form of group legal services plan involves a labor
union, professional group, or similar non-profit organization's pro-
viding an attorney for its members, or the group's suggesting that
members consult a particular attorney. Such plans have traditionally
involved a group with some primary purpose other than the render-
I RuLE OF T=E COURT OF APPF.As 3.476 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RCA].
2RCA 3.475 (1972). Whitmer, Group and Prepaid Legal Services, 36 Ky.
B.J. 21, 24 (July, 1972).
RCA 3.477.
4 RCA 3.477 precludes any member of the Kentucky Bar Association [here-
inafter cited as KBA] "who is actively engaged in the practice of law" from
having any such financial interest. Presumably an attorney who completely
retired from the practice of law in this state could maintain such financial interest
in a group or prepaid plan.
r The KBA and the Court are proceeding cautiously. These are temporary
rules, effective until June 1, 1978, in their present form. The rules may be
extended as drafted but the KBA has solicited comments and suggestions on the
temporary rules, and it may be expected that there will be some changes.
6 Voorhees, Group Legal Services and the Public Interest, 55 A.B.A.J. 534
1969), quoting ABA SPEc. CoMm. oN Av~u.Acm.rr or LEG;AL SEavicEs, REPoRT(1969).
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ing of legal services, and the services provided have been job-related.
The labor union which secures an attorney to handle workmen's
compensation cases for its members is a paradigm of such plans.
7
The identifying characteristics of such plans-and the mark of Cain
as far as many attorneys are concerned-is that the group selects the
attorney who will serve the members, or provides at most a limited
choice. This is seen by many as violative of the attorney-client
relationship and of the traditional methods by which individuals
have selected the attorneys who will represent them.
Prepaid legal services refers to a "system in which the cost of
possible legal services needed in the future is prepaid in advance
by, or on behalf of, a client who receives such services."8 The con-
cept has also been termed 'legal services insurance" and is perhaps
easier to understand when considered in this manner. Legal services
insurance has been defined as:
a group insurance arrangement under which the individual mem-
bers of a group . . . either directly or indirectly, pay insurance
premiums upon a policy of insurance which would provide pay-
ments for certain scheduled legal services expenses incurred by
the insureds. The insureds would be free to select the lawyer of
their choice who would be compensated by benefits paid by the
insurer....
Prepaid legal plans differ from group legal services in two very
important respects: they are not restricted to group-related legal
problems and they provide for freedom of choice by the group
member-client in his selection of an attorney.
II.
Prepaid legal services is a relatively recent development and may
be seen as a compromise solution to the controversy over group
legal services-a controversy which emerged slowly but has in recent
years erupted into a full-scale conflict.'0 The recent history of group
7 See, e.g., U.M.W. v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
8 Whitmer, supra note 2, at 22, quoting ABA SPECIAL REPoRT To NATiONAL
CoNFERENCE oz PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 1 (1971).
9 Barlow, Legal Services Insurance: Will It WorkP, 16 LA. BJ. 349 (1969).
The terms "prepaid legal services" and "legal services insurance" will be used
largely interchangeably in reference to a plan which provides for the payment of
some sort of benefit in response to a member's need for legal services and his
selection of his own attorney.
10There have been a number of articles written on the controversy-many
taking violent exception to one or more of the others. Consider, for example:
Cady, The Future of Group Legal Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 420 (1969); Cheatham,
A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 COLum. L.
REv. 973 (1963); Christensen, Regulating Group Legal Services: Who Is Being(Continued on next page)
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legal services has been written largely by the United States Supreme
Court." A decision which raised little controversy among members
of the bar at the time it was rendered but which in retrospect is
seen as a first step in the advent of group legal services is National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button.12 The
NAACP came into conflict with the laws of Virginia 13 by providing
the services of staff attorneys, paid by the organization on a per diem
basis, to litigants in suits involving school desegregation and other
racial discrimination cases. There was evidence that blacks were
unable to get local attorneys to represent them in their suits. Ap-
parently motivated by a desire to halt the NAACP's legal services
activities, the Virginia Legislature in 1956 expanded an 1849 law
which prohibited the solicitation of legal business by a "runner" or
"capper" to include in the law's definition of such persons "an agent
for an individual or organization which retains a lawyer in connection
with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has no
pecuniary right or liability." 4 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia held, when the matter was presented to it, that the activities
of the NAACP were properly proscribed by the law and also were
in violation of Canons 85 and 47 of the ABA Canons of Ethics.'5
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Protected-Against What-Any Why?, 11 ARiz. L. 1Ev. 229 (1969); Copaken,
Group Legal Services for Trade Associations, 66 Micn. L. REv. 1211 (1968);
Hourigan, Group Legal Services-An Old Wine In a New Bottle, 39 PA. B.A.Q.
18 (1967); Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14 Cxrv-
MAR. L. REv. 1 (1965); Pitts, Group Legal Services: A Plan to Huckster Pro-
fessional Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 633 (1969); Reisler, Legal Services for All-Are
New Approaches Needed?, 33 UNAtrH. PnC. NEWS 8 (Winter 1967); Zimroth,
Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76_YAix L.J. 966 (1967); Symposium
--The Availability of Counsel and Group Legal Services, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 279(1965); Note, Gr up Legal Services, 79 sty. L. Rzv. 416 (1965); Note, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the Services of
Attorneys, 72 HAv. L. Rzv. 1334 (1959).
denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).1y 2371 .S 45(9 3
' P3A." C st §§ O4-74, 54-78, and 54-79 (1950), as amended, Acts of
1956, Ex. Sess., ch. 33 (Rep. Vol. 1958).v
'4 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423 (1963). The language is the Courts
in partial paraphrase of the Virginia statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-78 (1950), as
amended, Acts of 1956, Ex. Sess., ch. 33 (Repl. Vol. 1958) provides in part:
(1) A "runner" or "capper" is any person, corporation, partnership
or association acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for
an attorney at law within this State or for any person, partnership,
corporation, organization or association which employs, retains or com-
pensates any attorney at law in connection with any judicial proceeding
in which such person partnership corporation, organization or associa-
tion is not a party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability....
This portion of the statute was later removed. Id., as amended, ch. 622 (1964).
25 NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1960).
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The NAACP challenged the decision on a number of grounds, but the
United States Supreme Court focused upon one central issue in its
decision-that the law "as construed and applied abridges the
freedoms of the First Amendment, protected against state action by
the Fourteenth." 6 In reversing the Virginia court, the Supreme Court
said "that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff
...are modes of expression and association protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under
its power to regulate the legal profession, as improper solicitation
of legal business. . . ."17' Many lawyers limited Button to its "civil
rights" locus of facts at the time the decision was rendered, and
there is language in the opinion to that effect.' 8 But as subsequent
decisions by the Court have indicated, in cases involving group legal
action on behalf of individual members, the necessity to balance
individual freedoms and the power of the state to regulate activities
harmful to its citizens is not limited to the area of civil rights.19
The Court articulated the balancing test to be applied and indicated
that the burden rests with the state to justify its regulatory interest:
"[Tihe State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest,
in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities
which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed."20
The second of the landmark decisions in the area of group legal
services is Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen V?. Virginia.21 Because
it arose in the same state and thus under the same law as Button,
Trainmen provides an accurate measure of the Court's expansion of
its rationale in the earlier case. The Brotherhood had advised in-
jured workers or the survivors of members killed on the job of their
rights under the Federal Employer's Liability Act and the Safety
16 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
17 Id. at 428-29.
I8 See, e.g., the following language:
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it
assists, while serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the
American Nego community, at the same time and perhaps more im-
portantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority
group to the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a group, associa-
tion for litigation may be the most effective form of political association.
Id. at 431.
19In support of this inference note the following language of the Court:
That the petitioner happens to be engaged in activities of expression and
association on behalf of the rights of Negro children to equal opportunity
is constitutionally irrelevant to the ground of our decision. The course
of our decisions in the First Amendment area makes plain that its pro-
tections would apply as fully to those who would arouse our society
against the objectives of the petitioner. Id. at 444.
20 Id.
21377 U.S. 1 (1964), rehearing denied, 877 U.S. 960 (1964).
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Appliance Act. It then recommended attorneys to handle claims for
members or their survivors. "The result of the plan, the Brotherhood
admits, is to channel legal employment to the particular lawyers ap-
proved by the Brotherhood as legally and morally competent to
handle injury claims for members and their families."2 There was
no "political" issue involved and no assertion that the members could
not obtain adequate counsel without group assistance, as in Button.
The union's national organization wanted the best possible repre-
sentation for its members; therefore it divided the United States
into sixteen regions and selected a practitioner or firm in each region
"with a reputation for honesty and skill in representing plaintiffs in
railroad personal injury litigation."23 The Supreme Court again
reversed the Virginia court's decision to ban group legal activity:
24
In the present case the State again has failed to show any ap-
preciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from
carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to repre-
sent injured workers. The Brotherhood's activities fall just as
clearly within the protection of the First Amendment. And the
Constitution protects the associational rights of the members of
the union precisely as it does those of the NAACP.25
Justices Clark and Harlan dissented: "By its decision today the
Court overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates
the practices of law to the level of a commercial enterprise."26 The
dissenters expressed their belief that Button should be limited to
cases involving "political expression," and they feared the decision
in Trainmen was one which "will encourage further departures from
the high standards set by canons of ethics as well as by state regulatory
procedures .... "27 For many that fear was realized the following
year with the Court's decision in United Mine Workers of America,
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association.28
Unlike the Brotherhood, the U.M.W. was actually engaged in
what has come to be more strictly defined as true group legal
services. It did not merely channel members to attorneys; rather it
retained salaried counsel to represent its members in workmen's
22 Id. at 5.
23Id. at 4.24 By order entered June 12, 1962, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused
the Brotherhood's petition for an appeal and thereby affirmed the injunction decree
of the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond. For the action of the Virginia
court following the Supreme Court's decision, see Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Commonwealth, 149 S.E.2d 265 (Va. 1966).2 5 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
26 id. at 9.
27 Id. at 12.
28 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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compensation proceedings. The Illinois Bar sought to enjoin this
activity as the unauthorized practice of law, and the Illinois Supreme
Court agreed.2 9 The Illinois court distinguished Trainmen as ap-
plicable only to referral of members to selected lawyers and Button
as limited to the areas of civil rights and political expression.30 The
United States Supreme Court did not agree that its earlier decisions
should be construed so narrowly: "We hold that the freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a
salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal
rights."31
The last chapter written by the Supreme Court in the recent
history of group legal services is United Transportation Union v.
State Bar.n 3 2 The Supreme Court of Michigan had enjoined activities
of the United Transportation Union33 substantially the same as those
involved in Trainmen.34 The complaint by the Michigan Bar set forth
as relevant factors: "that the Union recommended selected attorneys
to its members and their families, that it secured a commitment...
that the maximum fee charged would not exceed 25%o of the recovery,
and that it recommended Chicago lawyers to represent Michigan
claimants."35 Reduced to basic terms, the complaints were that the
union engaged in setting fees in contravention of local standards, and
employed out-of-state attorneys who could not be disciplined by the
State Bar except for withdrawal of the right to appear pro haoc vice. 36
In reversing the Michigan court, the Supreme Court, perhaps weary
of continued narrow construction by lower courts of its earlier
decisions, stated firmly the full import of all of its decisions in
this area:
In the context of this case we deal with a cooperative union of
workers .... But the principle here involved cannot be limited
291 I. State Bar Ass'n v. U.M.W., 219 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1966).
30 Id. at 509-10.
31 U.M.W. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967).
32 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
33 The merger of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen into the new United
Transportation Union in 1969, after the first entry of the Michigan decree and
before the hearing by the Supreme Court, accounts for the difference in the styles
of the cases.
34State Bar v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 174 N.W.2d 811 (Mich.
1970).35 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 577 (1971).36 Pro hac vice means literally "for this one particular occasion." BLACK'S
LAw DicnToNARY 1363 (4th ed. 1951). It refers to the admission of an out-of-
state attorney to practice before a court on an individual case basis and is a
matter of discretion with the admitting court. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
§ 15 (1965).
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to the facts of this case. At issue is the basic right to group legal
action, a right first asserted in this Court by an association of
Negroes seeking the protection of freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution. The common thread running through our decisions
in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if
courts could deny associations of workers or others the means of
enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation.
That was the holding in United Mine Workers, Trainmen, and
NAACP v. Button.3 7
III.
In 1970, a new Code of Professional Responsibility, replacing the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, became effective. The influence
of the Supreme Court decisions previously discussed is particularly
evident in Canon 238 of the new Code.39 Canon 2 notes that legal
services delivered in the traditional manner may be beyond the
means of even the middle-class citizens; 40 the Code provides that a
lawyer may receive compensation from a source other than the
client, with "the knowledge and consent of his client after full
disclosure,"41 thus opening the door for organizations to pay legal
fees for their members. But the provision which is most directly
aimed at the decisions of the Supreme Court on group legal services
is Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D). This section, setting forth mandatory
standards of conduct, provides in part that an attorney may participate
in legal aid service, military legal assistance, lawyer referral service,
37 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971).
38 Canon 2 provides that "A lawyer should assist the legal profession in
fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available." ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY CANON 2.
39 Unlike the old Canons, the new ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
smrrrr is divided into three types of statements of principle. There are now
nine Canons with Ethical Considerations [hereinafter cited as EC] and Dis-
ciplinary Rules [hereinafter cited as DR] as subparts under them.
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms .... the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are
derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in Character and rep-
resent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive....
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action. Id. Preamble and Preliminary Statement.
40 "Even a person of moderate means may be unable to pay a reasonable
fee which is large because of the complexity, novelty, or difficulty of the problem
or similar factors." EC 2-24.
41 EC 2-21.
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legal services activity of a bar association, or in the legal services
activity of
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes,
or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only
in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires
the allowance of such legal services activities, and only if the
following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation,
are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include
the rendition of legal services.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal ser-
vices to its members is incidental and reasonably related to the
primary purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from
the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services
are rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in that matter (emphasis added).2
The Disciplinary Rule permits participation in group legal services
only to the extent that the Supreme Court so requires such permission
by "controlling constitutional interpretation."43 It limits permissible
activity to the fact situations in the decisions which prompted the
rule; that is, although the organization must not have the rendition
of legal services as a principal purpose,44 the services provided must
be related to the primary purpose-the raison d'etre-of the organiza-
tion.45 The group must derive no financial benefit from the legal
services4" and the attorney-client relationship must be preserved.
47
It remains to be seen what tests of these provisions of the new Code
may be made. Disciplinary Rule 2-108(D)(5) indirectly challenges
the Supreme Court in asserting that the profession will permit only
such participation in group legal services as is required by the Court.
It may be expected that some group will confront the Code and force
a test before the Court, perhaps by forming an organization solely
for the purpose of rendering legal services or by some already
established group's providing legal services not related to the primary
purpose of the organization. This might include, for example, a
union's providing legal assistance to its members in estate planning,
property transfers, and even minor lawsuits.
42 DR 2-103(D) (5).
43 Id.44 DR 2-103()()()
45DR 2-103D (5) (b).
46 DR 2-103(D) (5) (c).
47 DR 2-103 (D) (5) (d).
1973]
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As a result of the adoption of RCA 3.475, the ethical guidelines
for furnishing group legal services are set forth in detail in Kentucky.
Of course the entire ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has been
adopted by the Court of Appeals,48 so the ABA's strict reading of
the Supreme Court decisions discussed previously is in force in this
state. RCA 8.475 is consistent with Disciplinary Rule 2-103, but it
serves to guide the practitioner in much more specific terms than
does the Code. The Rule begins with a definition of the term "group"
as "a professional association, trade association, labor union or other
non-profit organization or combination of persons, incorporated or
otherwise, whose primary purposes and activities are other than the
rendering of legal services."49 The definition is commendably broad,
for the Supreme Court's use of a first amendment rationale through-
out its decisions would certainly dictate that even a loose association
of persons be permitted to carry on such activities. The definition
also indicates, however, that the group must be one formed for
some other purpose than rendering legal services. This is consistent
with the failure of the Court to rule specifically on any such arrange-
ment and with the ABA's position of the acquiesence only to "control-
ling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the
services."50 Additionally, the legal services "must be no substantial
services rendered by the group but incidental thereto."5' This
provision indicates that legal services may not be a principal program
of the group; it should not be read to mean that the services may not
be substantial in scope.
52
The next requirement is that the group must seek out the attorney
who will serve it-and not the reverse 53-and must conform to a list
of ten restrictions or safeguards. These provisions are worthy of
discussion. The first requirement is that a member of the group
must be free to obtain independent counsel if he so desires.
5 4 It
has been suggested that the group should pay the legal expenses of
a member who finds he must obtain independent counsel because
48 RCA 2.130.
49RCA 3.475 (emphasis added).
50ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILITY DR 2-103(D) (5).
51 RCA 3.475 (emphasis added).
52 The programs of the UMW and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
were certainly substantial in terms of the numbers of members served and of
attorneys engaged in services, but the programs were incidental to the essential
"collective bargaining" purpose of a labor union.
5 3 For the attorney to recommend himself for employment to the group
would be in cear violation of DR 2-10(A). But see Cady, supra note 10, at
425, in which it is argued that an attorney who has not heen instrumental in
forming the group should be as free to seek such employment as he might seek
any other job.
54 RCA 3.475(a).
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of a conflict of interest with the group.5 5 The Rule next provides
that neither the group nor its agents or members may control the
performance of duties by the group's attorney,56 nor may they share
in the fees received,57 nor may an unlicensed person engage in the
practice of law under the arrangement.58 These provisions are
fundamental to preserving the independence of the attorney, but
they also raise some interesting questions. To what extent, for
example, may other group members or employees aid the attorney
in performing his duties?59 If they may do so and are compensated,
is the attorney in violation of the proscription against fee-splitting?6 °
Another unanswered question is whether the group, if it does not
interfere with details of performance by the attorney, is in violation
of the Rule by instructing the attorney that the overall objectives
of the group are to be furthered in all litigation.6'
The next safeguard 62 adds to the requirement that the services
be only incidental to the group's purposes the somewhat contradictory
provision that they also be reasonably related to its purposes. This
is the result of a strict reading of the Supreme Court's decisions and
clearly at variance with the Court's own analysis of its position.
63
It conforms, however, to the attitude of the ABA as expressed in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Any publicizing of the availability of group legal services must
be limited to "simple dignified announcements to the members of the
group" without naming any attorney who renders such service.
6 4
This provision is consistent with the attitude of the profession toward
publicity in general. 65 One might question, however, whether the
limitation on publicizing the service to group members only is a
realistic one. If an automobile club chose to provide legal services
within the guidelines of the Rule,66 would it be proscribed from
indicating to prospective members that it provided such service, or
n5 Cady, supra note 10, at 424.
56 RCA 3.475(b).
57 RCA 3.475(d).58RlCA 8. 475(d).
59 The facts in Trainmen, UMW, and United Transp. Union indicated that
members of the unions engaged in investigative and other duties, for which they
were compensated. There is no indication of actual preparation of cases by
non-lawyers, however.
60 ABA CODE OF PRormsSIONAL RESPONSxBILTY DR 3-102.
61 See Pitts, supra note 10, at 636.
62 RCA 3.475(e).6 3 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971).
64 RCA 3.475(f).
6 5 ABA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101.
(6 This hypothetical does not imply any opinion as to whether such an ar-
rangement would be of itself permissibie under the Rule and the CODE.
1973]
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would this be-as the secret handshake of a fraternal society-in-
formation available only after admission to membership?
The attorney must charge the group a "reasonable fee" for his
services.617 Minimum fee schedules are not compulsory, 68 but local
bar associations may be expected to examine carefully any consistent
rendering of services for less than the minimum fee. One fear of
the ABA is that group legal services could result in an overall decrease
in fees and a concomitant decrease in the quality of legal services
provided. As long as the total fee is reasonable in light of the
services rendered,69 it seems unlikely that bar associations would
insist that an attorney for a group charge the minimum fee on a
case by case basis.
The final three provisions of RCA 3.475 are administrative in
nature. An attorney who provides legal services to a group is
required to inform the Kentucky Bar Association of the arrangement
and to report annually on any changes in it.70 This policing pro-
vision is cast in broad terms71 and may include arrangements that are
not, properly speaking, group legal services. The last two provisions
indicate that the Rule is intended in no way to supersede the Code
of Professional Responsibility72 and that any violation of the Rule
will be treated as unprofessional and unethical conduct.73
The argument over group legal services will doubtless continue
for some time. The points are well taken that there are dangers of
abuse in some of the suggested programs and that there are probably
alternative means74 of reaching the desired goal of providing
meaningful legal services for every citizen. But until those alternatives
can be realized or until some group begins forcefully to promote them
rather than simply attacking the proponents of group legal services,
the requirement of serving a "real public interest,"75 as articulated
by the Supreme Court, should be the only check on the rendering
of such services.
67 RCA 3.475(g).6 8 ABA CoMm. ON PitoFESSioNAL ETHIcs, OPmoNs, No. 190 (1939).
69 ABA CODE OF PROFm-SioNAL REsPONsIrBIrrY EC 2-16.70 RCA 8.475(h).
71 The word "arrangement" as used in this paragraph means any agree-
ment or understanding whatsoever with groups or any representatives
of groups whereby any legal services are to be provided to group mem-
bers, and all systems or practices of referral whatsoever of grup members
by or through a group, whether such agreements or underrstandings or
systems or practices of referral be written, oral, or tacit. Id.72 RCA 3.475(i).
73 RCA 3.475(j).
74 See Reisler, supra note 10, at 10.
75 See Voorhees, Group Legal Sevices, 39 PA. B.A.Q. 18, 14 (1967).
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IV.
Unlike group services, prepaid legal services is enjoying tre-
mendous acceptance among attorneys. In a California survey, 91
percent of the lawyers polled "approved the implementation of a
state-wide prepaid legal services program," and 71 percent of these
attorneys "indicated they would be willing to participate in the
program."76 The California program involves periodic payments by the
participants, or on their behalf, into a fund from which disbursements
are made to meet the legal services needs of participants.77 The plan
is not envisioned as an insurance program; rather it is a pooling of
funds to be managed through a non-profit corporation, all of whose
members would be lawyers participating in the program. 78 A for-
malized pilot legal insurance program currently underway in Shreve-
port, Louisiana, has also attracted a great deal of attention. The
Shreveport Plan is designed to provide actuarial data on the
"frequency of such occurrences as inter alia, adoptions, successions,
real estate transactions, domestic relations problems, preparation of
wills, mortgages, leases, and consumer matters."79 In addition to
providing vitally needed actuarial data, the Shreveport Plan is also
supposed to "determine the causes and consequences of failure to
make timely use of legal services" and to test the specific program of
benefits being used in the Plan.80 An examination in some detail of
the Shreveport Plan should indicate what legal services insurance
in general is all about.
The Plan provides benefits for the insured in four major areas:
"(1) advice and consultation, (2) office work, (3) judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings, and (4) major legal expenses."8' In the
first category, there is a basic coverage provision of $100 per year
for consultation, limited to $25 per visit. There is no attempt to
dictate what the attorney may charge, so if the fee is $40, for
example, the insured must pay $15 of the total amount for that
visit.82 One criticism is, of course, that each insured may desire to
76California Lawyers Give Strong Support to State-wide Prepaid Legal
Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 948 (1972) [hereinafter cited as California Survey].
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Politz, The Longshot Answer?, 7 TwRAL 29 (March/April 1971). The
program was begun on January 1, 1971, and is to run for two years.
80 Id.
sl Id. at S0.
8 2 Much of the popularity of prepaid legal services among attorneys stems
from the fact that the participant is free to select his own attorney and the
attorney, to set his own reasonable fee. The California Plan includes a provision,
however, that participating attorneys must accept any rate schedule set up by the
(Continued on next page)
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get his $100 worth of benefits each year and thus may consult the
attorney even for trivial matters. The counter-argument is that the
plan encourages individuals to consult attorneys for legal planning
and preventive legal services, and that few persons will visit their
attorney if they have nothing of substance to discuss. The "office
work" benefit includes "investigation and research, conferences and
negotiations with opposing parties or attorneys, or document drafting
and review" with a maximum annual benefit of $250, subject to a
$10 pre-payment by the insured.83 The third major benefit covers the
cost of going to court or to an administrative hearing and provides
"$825 for legal fees, $40 for court costs, and $150 for out-of-pocket
expenses preparatory to such proceedings," subject to a $25 pre-
payment "if the insured is a moving party in litigation."8 4 The pre-
payment requirement is similar to the "deductible" clause in casualty
insurance plans and is designed to prevent trivial and harrassing
suits. The final benefit covers major legal expenses and provides
that "if expenses exceed the litigation benefits, the plan will reim-
burse 80 percent of the next $1000 of such expenses." 5
The plan is clearly geared to the needs of the middle-class insured
since, at most, he would realize less than $2000 in benefits in a given
year-assuming he has only one major lawsuit! When one considers
that "certain business expenses, successful contingent fee cases ...
fines and penalties" and other items are excluded from coverage,8
then the chances for abuse of the Plan appear remote indeed.
One of the biggest questions concerning prepaid as well as
group legal services is whether there is a need for such programs.
One writer argues that "almost without exception, people at every
social level can get lawyers when they want them, on a basis they
can afford,"87 while another points to the absence of any documenta-
tion of the need.88 It may be that the question of need for the
services is one that will require redefinition in the context of group
and prepaid programs. For example, the current wave of consumer
awareness indicates that many more individuals will need the services
of attorneys in this area in the future. Much of the need envisioned
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
board of directors of the corporation that is to administer the fund. California
Survey, supra note 76, at 949.8 3 Politz, supra note 79, at 30.
84 Id. at 31.
85 Id. at 32.
86 Id.8 7 Cedarquist, Panel Discussion on "Group Legal Services," 33 UNAumr.
PRAc. Nmvs 12, 15 (Fall 1967).88 Hourigan, supra note 10, at 23.
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by proponents of prepaid legal services is in the nature of "preventive
law,"89 a concept which has never really meant much to anyone
other than businessmen engaged in tax planning and similar activities.
It is expected that the insured client will consult his attorney before
encountering problems90 and that the attorney can utilize consultation
visits to diagnose minor legal problems before they develop into
major ones. On the other hand, it may be argued that legal insurance
does nothing more than assure that all or part of the bill will be
paid and provides no direction or incentive to visit an attorney for
diagnostic consultation. Clearly, 'legal insurance of itself is not
going to help people identify problems as legal [ones] or guide them
to a lawyer."91
There are a number of other problems which are treated in a
comprehensive article on legal services insurance by Professor Preble
StolZ. 92 Stolz argues that legal problems are usually concomitants
of pocketbook issues; the amount in controversy in a particular case
or the amount of legal fees required to reach the end desired by the
client frequently determines whether a legal solution to a problem
will be sought as well as the extent to which it will be pursued. It is
argued that legal insurance may upset the balance of nature in the
legal world by encouraging the employment of an attorney "in
instances when the value of the services is disproportionate to the
value of the underlying claim."93 Similarly the presence of insurance
may affect "the lawyer's decision as to the amount of legal service
to provide."94 The client's claim simply may not be worth the expense
of extensive research and expert testimony. As discussed by Professor
Stolz, the problem is one common to all sorts of insurance, that of
the insured's "using the proceeds of insurance to pay for something
that the insured would not buy if it were not for the insurance
benefit." 5 The client may use his benefits plus additional personal
funds to pursue a small claim beyond its economic feasibility under
the present system in which the client pays the entire bill. Thus it
may be seen that legal insurance could encourage trivial and harrass-
ing suits by removing part of the financial barrier to such actions.
One answer to the problem is the threat of disciplinary action against
89 Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 417, 418 (1968).90 Politz, supra note 79, at 29.
9' Stolz, supra note 89, at 422.92 Stolz, supra note 89, in its entirety.
93 Id. at 432.
94 Id. at 433.
95 Id. at 434.
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attorneys who maintain harrassing lawsuits or advance unwarranted
claims on behalf of their clients.
96
RCA 3.476 provides the ethical ground rules for prepaid legal
services in Kentucky and does not treat directly the problems of
implementation and abuse. Like the Rule governing group legal
services,97 it is a cautious statement of principle and adheres rigidly
to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. A prepaid legal
services plan is defined by the Rule as a "plan, program or insurance
policy" which pays, in whole or in part, the attorney's fees of a
member either directly to the attorney or through reimbursement of
the member.98 This definition covers both formalized legal services
insurance and any plan, however informal, whereby legal fees are
paid for group members. Clearly this could include a program operated
by a union or similar group to reimburse members out of a special fund
allocated for legal expenses. If the group does no more than pay the
fees and has no program of solicitation or control, there would appear
to be little reason for objection from the legal profession.
The Rule next lists seven requirements for prepaid legal plans.
The plan must allow a member to choose his attorney, and "no agent,
servant or employee" of the plan may even recommend the services
of any particular attorney or law firm.99 This provision makes clear
one major difference between group and prepaid plans: the member
is entirely on his own, both in terms of freedom of choice and of
lack of direction, in finding and engaging the services of an attorney.
It is next required that "no agent, servant or employee of the plan
or the plan itself' may interfere with the attorney in the performance
of his duties,100 nor may they receive any profit or any part of the
consideration paid to the attorney.1' 1 These are identical to require-
ments under RCA 3.475 and are of obvious merit in preserving the
independence of the legal profession. There are no "staff" attorneys
employed under prepaid plans, so there is no problem, as in the
case of an attorney who is hired on a salary basis, with whether he is
perhaps sharing his fee for services with the group. It should be
noted that there is a potential conflict between the first three require-
ments under the Rule and a plan similar to the informal California
plan discussed previously. 10 2 That program provided for a limitation
96 A CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102.
97RCA 3.475.
98 RCA 3.476.
99 RCA 3.476 (a).
100 RCA 3.476(b).
101 RCA 3.476(c).
1o2 California Survey, supra note 76.
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on selection by the client-participant to attorneys agreeing to par-
ticipate in the program, and it established certain requirements for
participation by attorneys, including the setting of fees. To the extent
that there is merit in the California plan, the Kentucky Rule should
be modified to permit a plan reasonably to limit selection of attorneys
to those agreeing to participate by adhering to any requirements
consistent with the ethical practice of law.
The fourth provision restricts publicity and soliciting activities
to "simple, dignified announcements setting forth the purposes and
activities of the plan or the nature and extent of the legal services
or both." 03 No attorney's name may be mentioned in any such
publicizing activities. There is no indication of any limitation on
the frequency with which publicity announcements may be made
nor on the communications media that may be employed. It is, of
course, a considerable liberalization of the restrictions under the
Code of Professional Responsibility on publicity by individual at-
torneys.104 The plan may advertise when an attorney cannot, but
it may be expected that the requirement that publicity be simple
and dignified would result in careful scrutiny by local bar associa-
tions. Since, under RCA 3.477, no practitioner may have any financial
interest in a group or prepaid plan, the fourth provision of RCA
3.476 will not provide a means of circumventing the proscription
against advertising.
The fifth requirement of the Rule-that a reasonable fee be
cbarged' 0 5-would seem compatible with even the California plan
so long as it is not construed to require that the minimum fee
schedule of a local bar association rigidly be followed. The last two
provisions are again the same as in the Rule governing group legal
services. They provide that RCA 8.476 is intended to conform to
the Code of Professional Responsibility' 6 and that violation of the
Rule is unethical conduct 0 7 which subjects the violator to possible
disciplinary action.
It should be noted finally that the third new rule, RCA 3.477,
which prohibits any person actively engaged in the practice of law'08
103 RCA 3.476(d).
104 ABA CODE OF POFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmLrY DR 2-101 and DR 1-102.
105 RCA 3.476(e).
1o RCA 3.476(f).
107 RCA 3.476(g).
108 Defined in RCA 3.020 as:
any service rendered involving legal knowledge or legal advice,
vhether of representation, counsel or advocacy in or out of court,
rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, or
business relations of one requiring the services.
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from having any financial interest in any group or prepaid plan, also
permits the establishment by the Kentucky Bar Association of a
corporation to render prepaid legal services. As indicated previously,
there are potential conflicts between the restrictions of RCA 8.476 and
the realities of establishing a plan operated by a non-profit corpora-
tion such as the one proposed in California.
V.
In recognizing the need to establish, "through court approved
rules, standards which delivery systems must meet before a lawyer
can render his services to the plan," 0 9 the new Kentucky Rules also
evidence a need for the establishment of improved delivery systems
for providing legal services to the middle class. By providing ethical
standards for their operation, the Kentucky Bar Association and the
Court of Appeals recognize the efficacy of some forms of group and
prepaid legal services plans and may thereby encourage the develop-
ment of such programs along responsible lines. It has been argued
that few people would actually take advantage of such plans if they
were available,110 but there is impressive evidence that middle-class
Americans do not sufficiently utilize preventive legal services'" and
that many "are not adequately served by the legal profession because
they cannot afford legal services at the time the need arises.""-2
Similarly a growing awareness that lawyers can remedy legitimate
individual grievances, as in the area of consumer complaints and
protection, should substantially increase the need for legal services.
The private bar could hardly be supplanted by group services since
business and property clients, currently the mainstays of the pro-
fession, could never satisfy their needs for legal services under
currently suggested group or prepaid plans.113
There is, of course, a strong public interest in preserving an
independent bar, and any proposed plan should be scrutinized as
to the possibility that it might result in the demise of the independent
10 9 Whitmer, supra note 2, at 25.
110 Reisler, supra note 10, at 12. Reisler points to the case of the Los
Angeles Culinary Industry Legal Aid Program in which only 3.23% of the
covered union members actually used the available services over a three year
period. The program eventually was dropped.
111 Stolz, supra note 89, at 418.
112 Whitmer, supra note 2, at 21, quoting INSrrruTE or INnusTmAL RELA-
TIONs, U.C.L.A., Conference on the Development of Prepaid Legal Services 159
(1971).
113 Christensen, supra note 10, at 236.
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solo practitioner. 1 14 With this in mind, the best solution to the
problem of delivery of legal services may well be utilization of legal
services insurance in combination with greatly expanded lawyer
referral systems.115 An individual covered by an insurance program
such as the Shreveport Plan would be encouraged to seek legal advice
without fear of incurring a large fee for legal services. But, beyond
this, the average citizen needs guidance in seeking out an attorney,
and this phase of the need could be met by a properly functioning
system of lawyer referral. Armed with his legal insurance coverage,
an individual should be able to call or visit the local bar association
and obtain the name of a qualified attorney, willing to handle his
particular problem. There is a potential conflict in this area with
the profession's restrictions on specialization,"(' but lawyers are per-
mitted in many referral systems to designate the particular categories
of cases they are willing to handle-without holding themselves out
as specialists in those areas. Combined with an ethical program of
alerting the public to the benefits of preventive legal services, broad
legal insurance coverage and meaningful lawyer referral could make
the services of attorneys more readily available to the average citizen
as well as aid the profession by providing clients informed and
interested in taking advantage of its services.
David C. Fannin
114 Copaken, supra note 10, at 1238.
115 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-15.
116 Id. DR 2-105.
